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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Sabah System Grid is made up of 66kV, 132kV and 275kV which link up all major 
towns in Sabah and Federal Territory of Labuan. As the Grid Owner, SESB is 
responsible for the development, management and operation of the Sabah System 
Grid. All activities pertaining to the System Grid are bounded by the Sabah and 
Federal Territory Labuan Grid Code. As demand grows, the network also gradually 
becomes larger, the transmission line are now operated closer to their limit. As a 
result, the networks are more vulnerable to the disturbance than before. In April and 
May 2012, two blackout events took place successively in the power grid of Sabah, 
which led to the major blackout. Currently, faulty issues in the system can lead to the 
cascaded failure to the system grid. These issues also can affect the rotor angle of 
generation motor and cause a loss of generation in the system grid. In this project, the 
conceptual of Sabah system grid was design for simulation purposes. Then, the 
identified potential point to be the weakest point was further study. The overall of 
Sabah system grid is designed and simulated using a PSSE. After that, the potential 
location to be the weakest point in the Sabah Grid is simulated and analyse. Based on 
the study conducted, the 132kV northern grid and 275kV interconnection between 
west coast and east coast is the weakest point in the Sabah system grid. In addition, 
both interconnections are source from the same substation which is Kolopis 
substation. Loss of Kolopis substation can lead to the total blackout of Sabah system 
grid. Finally, the weakest point in the Sabah system grid was successfully identified. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
 
Grid Sistem Sabah terdiri daripada 66kV, 132kV dan 275kV yang menghubungkan 
semua bandar utama di Sabah dan Wilayah Persekutuan Labuan. Sebagai pemilik 
grid, SESB bertanggungjawab untuk membangunkan, menguruskan dan 
mengendalikan Sistem Grid Sabah. Semua aktiviti yang berkaitan dengan Sistem 
Grid SESB adalah kawal selia Kod Grid Sabah dan Wilayah Persekutuan Labuan. 
Saban tahun, permintaan beban semakin meningkat maka rangkaian talian juga 
secara beransur-ansur menjadi semakin besar. Ini akan menyebabkan talian 
penghantaran kini beroperasi hampir kepada had maksimum. Hasilnya, rangkaian 
akan lebih terdedah kepada gangguan daripada sebelumnya. Pada bulan April dan 
Mei 2012, dua peristiwa gangguan bekalan berlaku secara berturut-turut dalam grid 
kuasa Sabah, yang membawa kepada blackout utama. Pada masa ini, isu-isu yang 
kerosakan yang berlaku didalam sistem  grid boleh membawa kepada kegagalan 
operasi dan menyebabkan masalah ini disebarkan kepada pencawang lain yang 
berdekatan. Isu-isu ini juga boleh mengganggu kepada kestabilan mesin penjanaan 
dan boleh menyebabkan kehilangan penjanaan dalam grid sistem. Di dalam projek 
ini, sistem grid Sabah akan direka dan bagi tujuan simulasi. Kemudian, titik potensi 
yang dikenal pasti untuk menjadi titik paling lemah dipilih untk kajian lebih lanjut. 
Keseluruhan grid sistem Sabah direka dan disimulasi menggunakan perisian 
PSSEBerdasarkan kajian yang dijalankan, grid utara 132kV dan 275kV sambungtara 
diantara pantai barat dan pantai timur merupakan titik yang paling lemah dalam 
sistem grid Sabah. Di samping itu, kedua-dua talian sambungtara ini mendapat 
sumber daripada pencawang yang sama iaitu pencawang masuk utama Kolopis. 
Apabila berlaku gangguan atau kerosakan pada pencawang masuk utama Kolopis, ia 
boleh membawa kepada gangguan bekalan berskala besar pada sistem grid Sabah. 
Akhir sekali, titik yang paling lemah dalam sistem grid Sabah telah berjaya dikenal 
pasti. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Project Background 
 
The SESB Gris is made up of 66kV, 132kV and 275kV which link up all major 
towns in Sabah and Federal Territory of Labuan. As the Grid Owner, SESB is 
responsible for the development, management and operation of the Sabah Grid. All 
activities pertaining to the SESB Grid are bounded by the Sabah and Federal 
Territory Labuan Grid Code. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Sabah system grid
2 
 
 
 
 
 The SESB Grid is essentially divided into three; West Coast Grid (WCG), 
Northern Grid and East Coast Grid (ECG) as in figure 1.1, with the bulk of the 
generation and load in the WCG. Currently, these two areas are linked via a 275kV 
transmission line crossing the mountainous Crocker range. The topological of the 
Sabah grid is in figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2: Topological of the Sabah grid 
 
Power market is growing continuously and the utility networks are in a large-
scale network to meet the market demand. Every utility company in the world is 
facing the same scenarios.  
As demand grows, the network also gradually becomes larger, the 
transmission line are now operated closer to their limit [1]. As a result, the networks 
are more vulnerable to the disturbance than before. It will increase the possibility that 
the interconnection network may lose its stability and leading to the regional and 
even causes a total blackout [1]. 
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As the demand continuously grows, the existing power grid cannot cater for 
the new demand. The existing power grid will operate closer to its limits. Without 
handling this new demand, the possibility of unstable condition in power grid can 
occur. This problem will disturb the frequency system which will lead to power grid 
failure. 
The capability of the power grid to transfer power for a long distance also 
enables the propagation of local failures into the network. The power grid operates as 
a typical infrastructure network with vital concern of the society and the human lives. 
If a cascading failure happens in the power system, the bigger the network, the 
impact of the cascading failure will be at large-scale. 
In recent years, there are many blackouts caused by cascading failures in the 
power system throughout the world. In April and May 2012, two blackout events 
took place successively in the power grid of Sabah, which led to the major blackout. 
In April 2012, state-spread blackouts happened to the Sabah system grid. The 
fault was started at one of the 66kV substation in KK area and cascaded to the 
neighbouring substation. At the same time, loss of several large generating units 
makes the voltage at the system grid low and subsequently collapses the system 
frequency which led to the blackout. As seen, cascading failure was the severe case 
that could happen and will give a big impact to the utility power grid. A proper study 
has been conducted after this event happened. A task force investigation team has 
been created to investigate the causes of the failure and to avoid the same event to 
occur in the future. 
Another event happened to the state of Sabah was in May 2012, faulty at 
66kV in KK area led to the cascading failure which had affected the neighbouring 
transmission line. At this time, several big generations are also tripped and cause the 
power grid to become unstable. In order to stabilize the power grid and avoid 
widespread of cascading failure, some of the KK areas was operated in islanded 
mode until the power grid was stable. 
In this proposal, an analysis to the Sabah power grid will be analysed to 
figure out the critical point that will lead to the power cascading failure. Finally, 
some findings and information for future planning to Sabah Power Grid for its 
reliable operation will also be analysed and discussed. 
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1.2 Problem Statements 
 
Sabah Electricity Sdn. Bhd is a utility company based in Sabah. As a utility 
company, the core business is to sell electricity to the consumer. Every year, the load 
demand in the state is continuously increasing. As the trending of load demand 
grows, the demand and expectation from the consumer to SESB also become high. 
The consumers are expecting reliable power will be supplied to them every day 
without fail.  
To meet the demand and expectation, proper future planning is important. All 
equipment that being constructed have their own limitation. The existing equipment 
in the transmission line will operate closer to its limitation. This will make the 
system vulnerable to disturbance and the power grid to be unstable. This unstable 
condition will lead to power grid collapse and subsequently to cascading failure. 
Since the transmission line has no contingency, failure in another line will cause the 
other transmission line to be overloaded and tripped. 
Another factor that contributes to the cascading failure is loss of generation in the 
power grid. As demand grows, a generation in the system should also be able to carry 
the load. Insufficient generation in the system will force the generator to run to its 
limits and created a thin reserve margin in the system. Sufficient reserve margin 
means the system is able to stabilize again when largest block of generation is trip in 
the system. Thin reserve margin will contribute instability in the system. Loss of 
generation occurs if there is a cascading failure in the power grid and make the 
system frequency fluctuated and also system voltage become low which will lead the 
generator to trip. Loss of generation in power grid will also disturb the system 
stability and can cause blackout. 
 
1.3 Project Objectives 
 
In a large-scale power grid system, more and more failure may occur during its 
operation. In this project, the major objective of this research is to analyse the 
operation of Sabah power Grid system.  
 Its measurable objectives are as follows: 
i. To figure out the critical point that will lead to the power transmission 
cascading failure. 
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ii. To propose future planning to Sabah power grid for its reliable operation 
 
1.4 Project Scopes 
 
This project is primarily concerned with the cascading failure. When cascading 
failure occurs, possibility of total blackout may happen in the power grid. 
 The scopes of this project are: 
a) To do stability analysis of Sabah power transmission network. 
b) Modelling the Sabah power transmission network. 
c) Collect the transmission line data. 
d) To give future planning power grid for reliable operation 
  
1.5 Thesis Structure 
 
In this thesis, it contains five chapters. For the chapter 1 is discussing on the 
introduction of this project. The introduction tell about the cascading event occur in 
the Sabah system grid. When cascading event occurs in the system, the system is at 
risk of total black out.  
Chapter 2 is the literature of review. Previous study conducted and journals are 
selected as a reference for this project. The enhancement proposed in the previous 
study is taking into account to be implemented if necessary. 
Chapter 3 discussed about the methodology. In this chapter, procedures to 
conduct a study using PSSE software are written. Using this software, few case study 
are built to be perform in chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 are discussing on the result and analysis. Further elaboration is 
discussed in this chapter. This chapter contain four cases study to determine the 
weakest point in the system.  
Chapter 5 is more to conclusion and future works to enhance and strengthening 
the Sabah System grid to its reliable operation.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 is about the literature review on the previous studies conducted by other 
researchers. In this chapter, few technology and method were compared and 
summarized. 
 
2.2 Theory  
 
From Saadat [22], the tendency of a power to develop restoring forces equal to or 
greater than the disturbing forces to maintain the state of equilibrium is known as 
stability. If the forces tending to hold machines in synchronism with one another are 
sufficient to overcome the disturbing forces, the system is said to remain stable [22]. 
 In stability, the concerned is the behaviour of the synchronous machines after 
a disturbance. Steady state stability refers to the ability of power grid to regain 
synchronism after small or slow disturbances, such as increase of load in the system 
of loss of generation. 
 
   
   
   
                           (2.1) 
The equation above is a nonlinear function of the power angle. However, for 
small disturbances, the equation may be linearized with little loss of accuracy as 
follows. Consider small deviation    in power angle from the initial operating point 
  . 
                        (2.2)
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Substituting to (1), we get 
 
   
         
   
                               (2.3) 
 
The above equation reduces to linearized equation in term of incremental 
changes in power angle. 
 
   
    
   
            =0               (2.4) 
 
The quantity           is the slope of the power angle curve at   . It is 
known as the synchronizing power coefficient, denoted as   . This coefficient plays 
an important part in determining the system stability and is given by 
   
  
  
|
  
                         (2.5) 
Substituting in (5), we have 
 
 
   
    
   
                       (2.6) 
 
The solution of the above second –order differential equation depends on the 
roots of the characteristic equation given by 
    
   
 
                   (2.7) 
 
When    is negative, we have one root in the right-half s-plane and the 
response is exponentially increasing and stability is lost. When    is positive, we 
have two roots on the j-w axis and the motion is oscillatory and undamped. The 
system is marginally stable with natural frequency of oscillation given by 
   √
   
 
                   (2.8) 
 
It can be seen from figure 1 that the range where    is positive lies between 0 
to     with a maximum value at no-load (     . 
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Figure 2.1: Power-angle curve 
The gradual increase of the generator power output until the maximum 
electrical power is transferred as in figure2.1. This maximum power is referred to as 
the steady-state stability limit and occurs at angular displacement of    . 
 
2.2.1 Power System Operation 
 
Electric Power Systems can be defined as the transformation of other types of energy 
into electrical energy and the delivery of this energy to the points of consumption. 
The basic power system is the combination of 3 major components which are 
generation (energy conversion), transmission/distribution and load/consumption as 
shown in Figure 2.2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: 3 major components in system grid 
 
When the basic power systems are connected together through transmission 
or distribution lines/equipment, they become an interconnected power system. The 
objective of power system operation is to keep the electrical flows and bus voltage 
magnitudes and angles within acceptable limits (in a viable region of the state space), 
Energy 
conversion 
Transmission
/ Distribution 
Load / 
Consumptio
n 
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despite changes in load or available resources. Security may be defined as the 
probability of the system’s operating point remaining in a viable state space, given 
the probabilities of changes in the system (contingencies) and its environment 
(weather, demand, etc.) 
 
2.2.2 Dynamic and Stability 
 
In power system, dynamic is about the study of the behaviour (trajectory, response 
and movement) of the power system states and controls following disturbances. 
Dynamic describes the behaviour, i.e., always changing or not remaining the same 
which sometime can be large and small. Since the power system is dynamic 
following a disturbance, states and controls will automatically adjust according to 
certain trajectories.  
Stability is the ability of the states and controls to return to certain operating 
equilibrium following the disturbance. Stability describes the consequence of the 
dynamic behaviour, i.e., its ability to regain a state of equilibrium after a certain 
dynamic changes. Frequency stability concerned with the ability of a power system 
to maintain steady frequency within a nominal range following a severe system upset 
resulting in a significant imbalance between generation and load. 
 
2.2.3 Reliability and Security 
 
The degree of performance of the elements of the bulk electric system that results in 
electricity being delivered to customers within accepted standards and in the amount 
desired. Reliability may be measured by frequency, duration, and magnitude of 
adverse effects on electric supply. Electric system reliability can be addressed by 
considering two basic functional aspects of the electric system, which are adequacy 
and security.  
 System security is a subset of power system reliability which comprises of 
two components which are related to the time-frame of power system dynamics: 
1) Adequacy   
- the ability of the power system to supply the aggregate electric power and 
energy requirements of the customers within component ratings & voltage 
limits, taking into account planned and unplanned component outages. 
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2) Security 
- The ability of the system to withstand specific sudden disturbance such as 
unanticipated loss of system components.  
- Power system security is the ability of a system to withstand without serious 
consequences any one of pre-selected list of “credible” disturbances 
(“contingencies”) 
 
2.2.4 Contingency Analysis 
 
Contingency analysis is the subject about evaluating adequacy and security through 
software application to give an indication of what might happen to the power system 
in the event of unplanned (or unscheduled) equipment outage. In power system 
operation, the results of contingency analysis are used to operate the system 
defensively where load flow program is used extensively for evaluating adequacy. 
Two components of contingency analysis are: 
1) Steady state security analysis  
- Determine state of the following disturbance when transients have settled by 
using load flow calculations. 
 
2) Dynamics security analysis 
- Disturbances such as line outages or loss of generation usually begin with 
transient changes in line flows and voltages before some steady-state 
condition are reached. 
- Contingency analysis for evaluating the network during transient is known as 
dynamic security analysis. 
 
2.3 Power System Simulator for Engineer (PSS/E) 
 
Power System Simulator for Engineer (PSS/E) is a software tool used for electrical 
transmission networks. It is an integrated, interactive program for simulating, 
analysing, and optimizing power system performance and provides probabilistic and 
dynamic modelling features. Since its introduction in 1976 it has become the most 
widely used commercial program of its type. The probabilistic analyses and 
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advanced dynamics modelling capabilities included in PSS
®
E provide transmission 
planning and operations engineers a broad range of methodologies for use in the 
design and operation of reliable networks. 
Since its introduction in 1976, the Power System Simulator for Engineering 
tool has become the most comprehensive, technically advanced, and widely used 
commercial program of its type. It is widely recognized as the most fully featured, 
time-tested and best performing commercial program available. PSS®E is an 
integrated, interactive program for simulating, analysing, and optimizing power 
system performance. It provides the user with the most advanced and proven 
methods in many technical areas, including: 
 
1) Power Flow 
2) Optimal Power Flow 
3) Balanced or Unbalanced Fault Analysis 
4) Dynamic Simulation 
5) Extended Term Dynamic Simulation 
6) Open Access and Pricing 
7) Transfer Limit Analysis 
8) Network Reduction 
 
2.3.1 Power Flow Analysis 
 
Power flow module is widely recognized as one of the most fully featured, time-
tested and best performing commercial programs available for power systems 
analysis. Over 30 years of commercial use and user-suggested enhancements have 
made the PSS®E Power Flow base package comprehensively superior in analytical 
depth, modelling and user convenience and flexibility. 
1) User-switchable choice of five solution methods including Newton-Raphson 
(full, decoupled, fast decoupled), Gauss-Seidel, and modified Gauss-Seidel 
2) Inertial and governor power flow redistributes generation after major load or 
supply changes 
3) Standard and complex contingency analysis and transfer limit calculations 
4) Automatic corrective actions for improving system responses 
5) System reliability calculations 
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6) Simulated generator economic dispatch or participation factors 
7) Generator reactive capability curves 
8) Extensive load modelling capabilities 
 
2.3.2 Dynamic Simulation Analysis 
 
PSS/E Dynamic Simulation module is a versatile tool to investigate system response 
to disturbances that cause large and sudden changes in the power system. The 
dynamic simulation module employs a vast library of built-in models for modelling 
different types of equipment, and with capability to create user defined models of 
any complexity. Several of the the features of the PSS®E dynamic simulation tool 
are: 
1) Time tested and robust algorithm that has been used by utilities all over the 
world. 
2) A comprehensive built-in library of dynamic simulation models to model 
equipment. 
3) Ability to create any disturbance such as, faults, generator tripping, motor 
starting or loss of field. 
4) Ability to carry out extended term simulation. This feature allows users to 
study long term effects such as frequency deviation as affected by prime 
mover response and voltage changes caused by protective equipment; and yet 
minimize computer time by providing a variable step integration technique. 
 
2.4 Description of Previous Methods 
 
Tan [1] proposed about strategy to prevent cascading outages in power system. All 
installation in the grid system was equipped with an adequate protection scheme and 
follows the requirement in the IEEE standard. Usually, transmission line protection 
was protected using a duplicated main protection with a delay back-up system 
[1].The main protection was used to protect the main equipment and the back-up 
protection was to provide back-up protection when the main protection failed to react 
within the time delay limit. 
The weakness of the conventional back-up protection relays in this scheme 
was that it generally takes action to protect a region without considering the impact 
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of the entire network [1]. As seen, this issue was likely to be more common as the 
networks grew bigger and networks are heavily loaded. 
Accuracy in communication between substations in the network became more 
critical [1]. This would help the grid operator to maintain the stability of the grid. 
The wide area back-up protection expert system (BPES) was an example of usage of 
wide area communication. This scheme works by providing selective and secure 
back-ups. BPES was operated at normal mode and emergency mode. During the 
normal operation, BPES monitor the open/closed states circuit breakers and the 
operational response of conventional protection relays on the network. BPES 
changes to emergency mode when a fault is detected in the system and it will decide 
the best way to isolate the fault if the main protection has failed. 
To prevent cascading outages, a precise location of a fault is critical so that 
only the affected circuit breaker necessary to be isolated [1]. The essential element 
required to implement wide-area backup protection is the availability of system-wide 
information which requires inter- and intra-substation communications. The recent 
significant developments in communication standards (IEEE P1 52.5, IEC 61850, 
61968 and 61970) make the application of wide area back-up protection systems 
feasible, and minimisation of the risk of cascading outages on the network is 
achievable in today’s power industry [1]. 
Bernstein [2] stated that in the utility facilities, the aging of each component 
depends on its usage. Every facility for example transformer, cable and substation 
has their own aging trending. Without proper maintenance, failure on the aging 
equipment may contribute to the blackout situation. Unforeseen problem such as 
changing of load demand will stress the equipment and more significantly, due to 
unpredictable random stress such as voltage surge from circuit breaker or from 
lightning strike or mechanical surges from load changes [2].A full knowledge of the 
aging stress mechanisms may not be necessarily useful in the prediction of functional 
life in a component [2]. Hence, engineering judgment may still be critical to a 
determination of dependable functioning for a given future interval of time [2]. 
Xiang Han [3] proposed that, in the power system, it is well known that 
protection systems play an important role in the manner in which a power system 
responds to catastrophic events. Misoperation of protection systems is often a 
contributing cause to the cascading process encountered in major power system 
failures throughout the world. Among possible failures of the protection systems are 
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the “hidden failures” (HF)[3].HF in protection systems are defined as “a permanent 
defect that will cause a relay or a relay system to incorrectly and inappropriately 
remove a circuit element as a direct consequence of another switching event” [3].  
The causes of HFs in protection occur as a result of the following two 
phenomena [3]. A protection element functionality defect (PEFD).This type of defect 
may be a result of hardware failures, out-dated settings, or human errors. The second 
contributing factor is the logical arrangement of devices with the PEFD. The logic 
will determine if the failure will or will not remain hidden within the protection 
scheme until another event uncovers the defect [3]. 
To reduce the frequency of catastrophic failures to occur, communication 
infrastructures play a critical role. Data networks capable of transferring critical data 
in a secure manner and with adequate latency are essential in this task. Data are 
needed in real time to achieve high-speed control and protection, and also in 
somewhat slower time (minutes) to communicate system state data to substation-
based control equipment to prepare them for foreseeable contingencies. High-speed 
communication networks will most likely be proprietary networks with ownership 
resting in power companies, while slower speed communications could be entrusted 
to the Internet with appropriate security measures built into the communication 
protocols [3]. 
Seong Il Lim [4] discussed about prevention of cascading failure. In the 
power systems, it should be designed to maintain a normal operating state in case of 
N-1 and some N-2 contingencies. 
A method to block zone 3 operations of distance relays is developed to secure 
time for defence systems to take remedial actions in order to mitigate catastrophic 
failures. To distinguish between actual faults on the protection zone with line flow 
transfers from other disconnected lines, a real-time power flow calculation technique 
and Internet based secure communication are used. A zone 3 blocking method used 
adaptive distance relay scheme (ADRS) and developed in this research. ADRS 
consists of one central control unit (CCU) installed in the control centre and several 
regional control units (RCUs) deployed at the substations. CCU calculates the initial 
line outage distribution factors (LODFs) and generation shift factors (GSFs) for the 
entire power grid and downloads the results to the RCUs. The topology data was 
acquired from the energy management system (EMS) and partially from RCUs if 
they are available at the substations [4].RCUs discriminate between faults with 
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power flow transfers and supervise distance relay tripping actions. Local 
measurements at the substation are used by the RCUs. RCUs at different substations 
communicate with one another [4]. 
The disadvantages using ADRS, it requires peer to peer (P2P) communication 
to acquire the information from other RCUs in the system. A fixed dedicated 
communication channel with proprietary protocols is widely used for power system 
control due to its reliability, speed and cyber security. But P2P communication using 
a fixed channel is not only expensive but also inflexible for the future expansion. To 
overcome the communication issue, using an optical fiber can overcome this issue. 
Optical fibers have enormous bandwidths and the Quality of Service (QoS) function 
provides an acceptable reliability [4]. Therefore, it is a good option to use shared 
communication networks [4]. 
Jaime [5] were discussing on the several kinds of models of cascading failure 
in power system. From the analysis of each models, each type of model have their 
own limitation. In this paper, on the basis of discussion of the mechanism of 
cascading failure due to man-made power grid, several existing model introduced are 
discussed and being commented respectively. In front of the more and more complex 
and huger system, the damage caused by cascading failure will increase rapidly [5].
 The defence of large blackout in power system led by cascading failure was 
not an easy procedure. It is need thorough study, which needs to be considered from 
almost every aspect of power system, such as the plan and design of power grid, the 
management of network operation, technologies of control in order to ensure the 
power system operates safely, efficiently and economically[5]. 
Xueguang [24] said that that the fault level is a measure of network 
robustness. A high fault level is a good indicator of the strength of the system 
suggesting close proximity to generating stations or a highly interconnected system. 
A high fault level implies low impedance between source and load and hence is 
associated with good system voltage profiles and low magnitudes of voltage dips 
when they occur. It also has a beneficial influence on the speed of operation of 
protective devices under fault conditions. Therefore on the whole a high fault level is 
not a bad thing. However, these benefits come at a price as high fault levels require 
switchgear and other equipment with high rupturing capacities, which is expensive. 
A balance must therefore be struck between the benefits of high fault level and the 
cost of necessary switchgear and other plant. In general short circuit breaking 
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capacities of switchgear are standardised. In the event that the connection of DG 
causes the fault level to rise above the existing switchgear rating, it becomes 
necessary to find ways to reduce the fault level as a cheaper alternative to 
replacement of the switchgear, which in most cases is a costly solution. A much 
more common and less expensive approach to fault level reduction is network 
splitting. With this scheme, it will decrease the flexibility of the network compare to 
the ring network.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
3.1 Project methodology 
 
This research is adopting the methods approach which involves develops and 
simulates the case study to enhance Sabah power grid to its reliable operation. Since 
simulation is based on the collected data, verification of data important so that result 
generated from the software is accurate and reliable. 
The derivation of the lines and underground cables sequence data was 
conducted using PSCADTM/EMTDCTM software by Manitoba – HVDC Research 
Centre. It is a simulation tool widely used by electrical engineers for analysing 
electromagnetic transients of electrical systems particularly in doing planning and 
operation, design of HV equipment, preparation of tender specifications and teaching 
and research. 
Among some of the typical applications of the PSCADTM/EMTDCTM 
software are as follows:  
1) Over voltage studies during lightning and breaker switching 
operations 
2) Insulation coordination studies 
3) Harmonics penetration studies due to FACTS devices 
4) Specification of equipment ratings 
5) And many other extensive applications of power systems.  
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All of the above applications require extensive modelling of the power 
system in order to accurately analyse the response of the power system during a 
disturbance.  
For the Power System Analysis, software that is being widely used is called 
Power System Simulation for Engineer (PSSE). This software usually uses all the 
data generated from the PSCAD and will store in the PSSE software. Having 
accurate and verified data will produce more accurate result and outcome analysis. 
PSSE mainly consist of; 
1) Load flow analysis 
2) Voltage analysis 
3) Dynamic analysis 
Load flow analysis or steady state analysis basically referring to the 
compliance of Sabah and F.T Labuan Grid code and also Planning criteria such as N-
1 and N-2 criteria. Analysing the voltage level in the system is important as a 
measurement of the stability Grid System to withstand whenever faults occur in the 
system.  
As for dynamic analysis, it helps the engineer to conduct a study when a 
generation loss in the system and to prepare mitigation plan to avoid cascading effect 
in the system.  
The overall Grid system of Sabah is simulated to find the weakest point that 
can contribute to the cascading effect. In order to find the weakest point, few case 
studies were conducted and being analyse. In the windows of 5 years starting from 
2010 to 2014, few event related to cascading effect contribute to the state-wide 
power disruption. Subsequent to the state-wide power disruption event, TNB and 
SESB form a task force called TNB-SESB Planning Working Group (TSPWG) to 
conduct a post event simulation and mitigation plan to avoid this event to be happen 
in the future. In the report from the TSPWG, it is suggested that the 66kV network 
are to be reviewed and upgraded. In addition, the incident of state-wide power 
disruption happened in 2012 was due to the 66kV that is fragile and also aging.  
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Figure 3.1 shows the stages for verification of data. After verification of data 
completed, then a base case created. Verification and sanitization of data is important 
to get more accurate and close to actual result. This process can lead to the proper 
result analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure3.1: Data collection for Power System Study 
 
Information gathering 
Derivation of sequence data 
Data comparison 
Adoption data and update base 
case 
Agree latest 
data? 
YES 
NO 
START 
END 
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Figure 3.2shows the step on how simulate and perform a fault level study for 
overall system grid. Fault level study will determine which substations are exposed 
to high risk during operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Step to do fault level simulation using PSSE 
 
 
 
 
 
Select case study  
Run a fault level study 
using PSSE 
Do analysis on report 
Run a simulation using 
PSSE 
Execute  
START 
END 
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Figure 3.3 shows the method on how to perform simulation for 132kV and 
275kV network system by applying the N-1 and N-2criteria. The effect of the loss of 
one line in the system can contribute to overloading at the transmission line and may 
cause loss of both lines. Hence, cascading effect may occur during this condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Process to do the simulation using PSSE. 
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3.2 Power System Modelling 
  
The process starts with the consideration from the first principles of a single-phase 
alternating ideal voltage source connected to a linear network made up of resistance, 
inductance, and capacitance elements. The mathematical formulation is a set of linear 
ordinary differential equations. The SAV case file is first to be modelled, through 
data handling, updating and manipulation. Basically, this SAV case file will be the 
database for the whole study system which includes the bus data, load data, branch 
data, generator & plant data, transformer data and etc. Figure shows the sample of 
PSS/E Graphical User Interface (GUI) for Power Flow Analysis of Sabah Grid 
System database as illustrated in figure 3.4.  
 The bases for network data are the raw data files (*.raw), which are ASCII 
text files, and the Save Case files (*.sav), which are binary files containing not only 
the network element data but also other information such as run-time options. Other 
data files having specific applications are used by PSS/E and described in the 
appropriate sections of this guide. 
 
Figure 3.4: Database system for Sabah Grid in PSS/E 
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There are three Newton solutions and two Gauss solutions which are 
available for use during the iteration process as shows in figure 3.5. 
 Area interchange control (both Newton and Gauss). 
 Control of Transformer taps (both Newton and Gauss.) 
 A variety of other solution options (vary by type of solution). 
 Control of Var limits (only Newton). 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Solution type and controls 
 
 The convergence characteristics of iterative solutions of the network 
condition and of the boundary condition are quite different from one another. Since 
the network condition is linear, its iterative solution is dependent upon the numerical 
values of the elements of the network admittance matrix, Ynn, but it is largely 
independent of the estimates of node voltages and of the load characteristics. There 
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are 5 methods of iteration schemes to converge on the power flow solution which is 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Power Flow Solution Activities comparison 
 
Activity/Iteration 
Method 
Advantages Disadvantages 
SOLV 
Gauss-Seidel 
Iteration 
 Tolerant of data 
errors, insoluble 
conditions in local 
areas of network.  
 Fails gently, 
indicates areas of 
network causing 
problem. 
 Cannot handle negative 
series reactance. 
 Acceleration factor must 
be tuned to match system 
for optimum performance. 
 Number of iterations 
increases as system size 
increases. 
MSLV 
Modified Gauss- 
Seidel Iteration 
 Has most 
advantages of 
SOLV and is able 
to handle series 
capacitors between 
Type 1 buses. 
 Convergence is very 
sensitive to tuning of 
acceleration factor, 
ACCM. 
 Slight deviation of ACCM 
from optimum.                             
 Value gives poor 
convergence. 
FNSL 
Full Newton- 
Raphson Iteration 
 Rapid convergence 
on well-conditioned 
cases. 
 Small bus 
mismatches can be 
achieved. 
 Intolerant of data errors. 
 Cannot start from poor 
voltage estimates. 
 No indication of cause of 
problem when failing to 
converge. 
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